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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
Case No. 940568-CA
Priority No. 2

CHARLES DAVID WRIGHT,
Defendant/Appellant.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. section 78-2a-3(2)(f), whereby a defendant in a district
court criminal action may take an appeal to the Court of Appeals
from a final judgment and conviction for any crime other than a
first degree or capital felony.

See also Utah R. Crim. P. 26(2) (a).

STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The pertinent parts of the following statutes and
constitutional provisions are contained in the text of this brief or
in Addendum A:
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Fed.
Utah
U.S.

Code Ann. § 63-63a-l(b)(i)(A)
Code Ann. § 76-3-201(2)
Code Ann. § 76-3-203(3)
Code Ann. § 76-3-301(1)(b)
Code Ann. § 76-4-102(3)
Code Ann. § 76-10-306(3)
Code Ann. § 77-1-6(2)(a)
Code Ann. § 77-18-1
R. Civ. P. 60(b)
R. Crim. P. 22
R. Crim. P. 32(b)(1)
Const, art. 1, § 12
Const, amend. V

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Did the trial court erroneously twice sentence Mr. Wright
for the same offense in violation of the constitutional and statutory
protections against double jeopardy?
"Since questions of constitutional rights are questions of
law, we give no deference to the trial court's conclusion

..."

State v. Mitchell, 824 P.2d 469, 471 (Utah App. 1991); cf. Grayson
Roper Ltd. v. Finlinson, 782 P.2d 467, 460 (Utah 1989) ("A trial
court's legal conclusions are accorded no particular deference");
State v. Swapp, 808 P.2d 115, 120 (Utah App.) ("When examining a
trial court's interpretation of a statutory provision we apply a
correction of error standard"), cert. denied, 815 P.2d 241 (Utah
1991); State v. Gibbons, 779 P.2d 1133, 1135 (Utah 1989) (appellate
courts "will set aside a sentence imposed by the trial court if the
sentence represents an abuse of discretion, if the trial judge fails
to consider all legally relevant factors, or if the sentence imposed
exceeds the limits prescribed by law") (citations omitted).
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT AND A WRITTEN OPINION
Although the Tenth Circuit and other jurisdictions have held
that a trial court's oral sentence cannot be altered or superseded by
a resentencing order which exceeds the punishment first imposed, Utah
law does not specifically address the issue when a lawfully imposed
sentence includes a term of incarceration which already has been
partially served by the defendant.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATORE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a (re)sentence imposed following a
conviction for attempted possession of incendiary device, a third
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-4-102(3);
76-10-306(3).

(R 38-39; 83). On May 23, 1994, Mr. Charles David

Wright pleaded guilty to the above charge pursuant to his plea
bargain agreement.

(R 23-31; 54-65).

Following a continuance of

the date set for sentencing, the proceeding was set for July 11.
On July 11, 1994, the trial court sentenced Mr. Wright to
zero-to-five years in the Utah State Prison; a fine of $500.00
together with an 85% surcharge; and an order of restitution if
deemed to be appropriate.

(R 77-78).

The prison sentence was

immediately stayed pending the successful completion of probation.
(R 78) . Probationary terms and conditions included twelve months in
jail (without credit for time served) although an earlier release
from jail was allowed if Mr. Wright provided verification of his
employment to Adult Probation and Parole.

(R 78-79).

Other terms

and conditions included counseling or therapy (as recommended by
AP&P); "any drug program if that is a problem"; "submit your person
and your effects, your automobile, your residence, to search or
seizure for the location of drugs"; and accompanying standard
probationary terms prohibiting drug use or involvement.

(R 78-79).

On August 29, 1994, after Mr. Wright had already spent
50 days in jail since his July 11, 1994 sentence, the trial court
again imposed sentence.

(R 94). No new charge or violation

occurred; the August 29, 1994, resentencing proceeding stemmed from
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the very same underlying charge and conviction as the July 11, 1994
sentencing proceeding.

(R 80-94).

Claiming that the July 11 proceedings were merely
"musings", (R 91), on August 29, 1994, the court resentenced
Mr. Wright to zero-to-five years in the Utah State Prison with
credit for time served.

(R 94).

In contrast to its July 11, 1994,

sentence, see (R 77-78), on August 29, 1994, the court determined
that probation would not be appropriate.

(R 38, 94). During the

second sentencing proceeding, no fine was imposed although
restitution was again ordered if found to be appropriate.

(R 38,

94) .
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
While the facts of the offense are not necessarily germane
to the issue on appeal, the sentencing proceedings themselves are
important.

The pertinent discussions are excerpted or recounted in

detail below.
Following the entry of plea proceeding, the court set
June 20, 1994, for sentencing with the understanding that substitute
defense counsel would appear for Mr. Wright.
June 20, 1994, sentencing was continued.

(R 65).

However, on

The court and substitute

defense counsel expressed a preference to wait until Mr. Wright's
original counsel had returned.

(R 67-68).

In addition, the court

ordered another presentence report notwithstanding the existence of
an abbreviated report on Mr. Wright which included a criminal
history.

(R 69) (the relevant discussions are footnoted below and
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attached in Addendum B) .-1 The decision to await original defense
counsel's return, however, was accompanied by the following court
order:
The court: All right. What I'm going to do is this.
I'm going to order a presentence report. . . .

The court: All right. What I'll do is I'll set this
for the 11th of July, which is the first time she's
[original defense counsel] available to be back. But
in the meantime, I'm also going to order a presentence
report. But that report will not be completed before
the 2nd of August.
If she [original defense counsel] can persuade me, we
can proceed on the 11th without the report being
completed, then I will do so. If not, then we'll keep
the next date that I give you.
So order a presentence report. I will set this for
July 11th at two p.m., and then we'll also set another
date, and that is August 1 at two p.m. for sentencing
in the event that we do in fact have the presentence
report.
(R 67-70) (emphasis added).

The proceedings concluded until July 11,

1994, the date in which the court would first impose sentence.

1. During the June 20, 1994, proceedings, substitute
counsel for Mr. Wright entered into the following discussions with
the court and the State:
[Substitute defense counsel]: Because I talked to
Mr. Wright and indicated to him I felt more comfortable, at
least in light of my looking at the presentence report, to
have [original defense counsel] address the court. He
indicated that he wanted to try to get this over with
today. But I think it would be important -The court: The only presentence report, though, is his
criminal history. I think you would be better

- 5

On July 11, 1994, Mr. Wright and his original counsel
appeared before the court for sentencing.

While the presentence

report with a criminal history still was available, the report
ordered on June 20, 1994 was not ready.

(R 73-74) ("Apparently

somehow the referral never made it to [AP&P] or [AP&P] didn't get
down to interview Mr. Wright").

Nevertheless, the sentencing

proceedings continued as Mr. Wright's original counsel persuaded the
court that even without the ordered presentence report, c£. (R 70),
Mr. Wright was entitled to probation:
[Counsel for Mr. Wright]: I believe the State is
still willing to recommend probation on this case [.]
[the State originally recommended probation when it
appeared that he would be extradited to Iowa.] . . .

1. -[footnote continued]served to wait until [original defense counsel] gets here,
[Mr. Wright]:

Okay.

[The State]: Do we know why the only thing we have is that
criminal history?

The court: I don't know. Did you look to see if we have
an old presentence report prepared in another court?
I mean, if for no other reason, we need [original
defense counsel] to refresh our recollection on this.
[The State]: I assumed there was a presentence report, but
I don't see it.
[Substitute defense counsel]: Let me tell you why there is
no presentence. There was a old -- out of state of Iowa -extradition hold. And part of the plea agreement in this

This incident took place at the co-defendants
house. Apparently Mr. Wright and the co-defendant had
some materials for pipe bombs. They went out to their
back yard where there was nobody around, Mr. Wright
and the co-defendant let off one of the pipe bombs.
The neighbor called because of the noise and smoke
that was coming back from the back yard. The police
came over and investigated, and found some gun powder
and some pipes at the co-defendant's residence.
Mr. Wright was . . . there. Mr. Wright had indicated
to me that he has employment that he's able to go to
if he is released. He obviously has done 120 [days in
jail through] today, he was booked on March 7, 1994.
And I would ask the court to put him on probation,
refer him to [AP&P]. He does have -- has been
diagnosed as being bipolar, and I think Adult
Probation and Parole can have him evaluated and have
him undergo any counseling if needed.

The court: All right.
anything on this?

[The State], do you have

[The State]: Your honor, I submit it. I think if we
can verify employment, I don't think I would be
hesitant in going along with that.
(R 75-77).

Following statements by defense counsel and the

prosecution, the trial court asked Mr. Wright if he had anything to

1. -[footnote continued]case was that if Mr. Wright agreed to return to the state
of Iowa, that the recommendation would be probation.
What [original defense counsel did] is contact . . . the
head of the warrants division at the sheriffs office, and
she discovered that Iowa doesn't have an NCIC Warrant, only
a legal warrant in Iowa.
So they are not going to extradite him.
are at, I think.
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So that's where we

say before it imposed sentence.

(R 77). After Mr. Wright exercised

his right of allocution, the court lawfully imposed sentence:
The court: In this matter, Mr. Wright, is there
anything you wish to say before sentence is imposed?
[Mr. Wright]: The only thing I could say is, I just
really had no idea what we were doing was this
serious. We were just making little fire works. Now
that I know, of course, this will not happen again.
The court:

Anything else?

[Counsel for Mr. Wright]:
The court:

No your Honor.

In this matter, Mr. Wright, in which you

1. -[footnote continued]The court: I wonder if we ought to have a presentence
report done at this time, then.
[Substitute defense counsel]:

That may be appropriate.

The court: All right. What I'm going to do is this.
going to order a presentence report. . . .

I'm

The court: All right. What I'll do is I'll set this for
the 11th of July, which is the first time she's [original
defense counsel] available to be back. But in the
meantime, I'm also going to order a presentence report.
But that report will not be completed before the 2nd of
August.
If she can persuade me we can proceed on the 11th without
the report being completed, then I will do so. If not,
then we'll keep the next date that I give you.
So order a presentence report. I will set this for July
11th at two p.m., and then we'll also set another date, and
that is August 1 at two p.m. for sentencing in the event
that we do in fact have the presentence report.
(R 67-70) (emphasis added).
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plead[ed] guilty to [a] third degree felony, the court
will impose a sentence of zero . . . to five years in
the state penitentiary, a fine of five hundred
dollars, [eighty-five] percent surcharge, and an order
of restitution, if that's appropriate. I don't know
that it's appropriate. Your period in the state
penitentiary will be stayed pending successful
completion of probation, which will have the following
terms and conditions: You're to serve 12 months [in]
Salt Lake County Jail, without credit for time served.
Now, in setting that, because I don't know exactly
what to do now, I want . . . Adult Probation and
Parole for them to verify by some means other than
just merely calling a phone number, to verify your
employment.
If that's verifiable, then I would very likely
allow you out right then to begin your work. But
since I'm unsure right now, I'm going to make it 12
months.
You're to complete any counselling or therapy
recommended by . . . Adult Probation and Parole.
Which may include a drug evaluation, and compliance
with any drug program if that is a problem. You're to
submit your person and your effects, your automobile,
your residence, to search or seizure for the location
of drugs.
You're to submit your person for the testing or
presence of the unlawful drugs in your blood stream.
And you're not to use any unlawful drawings or possess
any [paraphernalia]. You're not to associate with
persons who knowingly use drugs in an unlawful
fashion. You're not to frequent places where drugs
are known to be unlawfully used or distributed.
And I'm going to -- how is it easier -- I guess it
will take another appearance to allow him to get out
earlier than the 12 months, but what I want is for
. . . Adult Probation and Parole, so they know exactly
what should happen when Mr. Wright is released, in
terms of counselling, therapy or what have you, and to
have verified that he does in fact have the
employment. Because the employment is one of the key
factors that I'm relying upon for a release earlier
than the 120 days.
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So Mr. Wilson [of AP&P] will be down to see you in
jail some time this week to talk to you about this
matter. It will be 36 months probation.
(R 77-79) (emphasis added).
On August 29, 1994, sentencing proceedings were again held
despite the objections of Mr. Wright's counsel.

(R 83-84).

According to the court, the July 11, 1994, sentence only constituted
"musings".

(R 91).

While the court acknowledged the July 11, 1994,

proceeding, it attempted to justify another sentencing proceeding on
the grounds that:
When this matter was originally set for sentencing
[on July 11], there was not someone present from the
presentence arm of Adult Probation and Parole. And
the county attorney [then] attending . . . could not
have been expected to know . . . that we'd ordered a
presentence report.
It's not your obligation [defense counsel's] to
bring that to my attention when it appears as if I'm
about to do something that's favorable to you client.
No one brought that to my attention. I am not
suggesting in any way it was your obligation, because
I don't think it was.
As a consequence, I didn't realize that on some
prior occasion I had indicated I did need a
presentence report. There was no one here to be heard
from on the other side, and that's why I proceeded as
I did, because all I had in front of me was a
memorandum dated June 6, 1994, reciting only the
criminal history of the defendant.
When I was apprised that I did not have all the
information that I had originally sought, that was
when I made sure that I did not take the final step in
imposing a sentence, and that is, signing the
documents. That's when this matter was put back on
the schedule, and that's why we're here today.

- 10 -

(R 85-86) . The court also referred repeatedly but mistakenly to
Orange Street, a treatment center, as a probationary term or
condition.

(R 82, 83, 94). The court did not argue that the first

sentence imposed was illegal.
Instead the focus turned to psychological evaluations which
had diagnosed Mr. Wright as having a mental illness.
(R 88) ("In 1980 they said he was . . . antisocial.

See, e.g.,
Another said he

was passive aggressive in 1981"); but cf. (R 76) (the court already
had been earlier informed of Mr. Wright's bipolar diagnosis during
the first sentencing proceeding on July 11, 1994).

Treatment

programs also were discussed, but such programs either did not
consider Mr. Wright to be an appropriate candidate or would not
place him without a court referral.

(R 88-89; 91-92).

After addressing such matters and without even suggesting
the occurrence of a new or different violation since the July 11,
1994, sentencing proceeding, the court again sentenced Mr. Wright on
August 29, 1994, for the same underlying conviction:
The court: All right. Mr. Wright, is there anything
you wish to say before sentence is imposed?
[Mr. Wright]:

No

The court: In this matter the court will impose
sentence of zero to five years in the state
penitentiary. It will impose no fine. There will be
an order of restitution, if restitution is
appropriate. Given the defendant's inability to
complete Orange Street before, and there is an
elaborate indication in the presentence reports as to
why, that was one half-way house that I had in mind,
and I either expressed that on the record or I was at
least thinking that.

- 11 -

Now, the presentence report indicated to me that
that would probably be an inappropriate placement, and
as a consequence, there's no other placement I have.
For this reason, this is not a an appropriate case for
probation.
[Counsel for Mr. Wright]:
served -The court:

Your Honor, Mr. Wright has

He will get credit for time served.

[Counsel for Mr. Wright]:

163 days from March 6.

(R 94); see also (R 38).
Mr. Wright appeals the court's second sentence, an order in
excess of the previously imposed July 11, 1994, sentence.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
A court's oral sentencing order is valid and enforceable.
Particularly where, as here, a defendant has begun to serve a period
of incarceration pursuant to the court's oral sentence, the validity
of the oral sentence is not suspended indefinitely by the court's
delayed signing of the order.
sentence.

The court may only correct an illegal

Since the court's initial oral sentence was entirely

proper, it lost jurisdiction to "correct" the matter.

The court's

attempt to do so violated the statutory and constitutional
protections against double jeopardy.
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ARGUMENT
THE COURT'S ORAL SENTENCING ORDER, WHICH REQUIRED
MR. WRIGHT TO IMMEDIATELY BEGIN HIS PERIOD OF
PROBATION, WAS VALID AND ENFORCEABLE AND A SUBSEQUENT
WRITTEN SENTENCE WHICH ATTEMPTED TO INCREASE ITS PRIOR
ORDER WAS A NULLITY AND AN IMPROPER MULTIPLE PUNISHMENT
"The Double Jeopardy Clause affords three separate
constitutional protections.

Under the clause, either an acquittal

or a conviction on a particular charge bars another prosecution on
the same charge.
same offense."

The clause also bars multiple punishments for the
State v. Holland, 777 P.2d 1019, 1023 (Utah 1989)

(emphasis added); see U.S. Const, amend. V ("nor shall any person be
subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or
limb"); Utah Const, art. I § 12 ("nor shall any person be twice put
in jeopardy for the same offense"); accord Utah Code Ann.
§ 77-1-6 (2) (a) .
In the case at bar, Mr. Wright pleaded guilty to "attempted
possession of an incendiary device", (R 23-30), a third degree
felony.

Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-4-102(3); 76-10-306(3).

By statute, a

punishment for a third degree felony may include "a term not to
exceed five years", Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203(3); a $5000.00 fine,
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-301(1) (b); a surcharge, Utah Code Ann.
§ 63-63a-l(b) (i) (A) ; and/or a period of probation.
§§ 76-3-201(2) (c) ; 77-18-1(2) (a).

Utah Code Ann.

In accordance with the above

authorities, on July 11, 1994, the trial court imposed the following
lawful sentence:
The court: In this matter, Mr. Wright, in which you
plead[ed] guilty to [a] third degree felony, the court
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will impose a sentence of zero . . . to five years in
the state penitentiary, a fine of five hundred
dollars, [eighty-five] percent surcharge, and an order
of restitution, if that's appropriate. I don't know
that it's appropriate. Your period in the state
penitentiary will be stayed pending successful
completion of probation, which will have the following
terms and conditions: You're to serve 12 months [in]
Salt Lake County Jail, without credit for time served.

. . . Because the employment is one of the key
factors that I'm relying upon for a release earlier
than the 120 days.
So Mr. Wilson [of AP&P] will be down to see you in
jail some time this week to talk to you about this
matter. It will be 36 months probation.
(R 77-78) (July 11, 1994, sentencing proceeding) (emphasis added).
In setting the 12 month jail term, the court did not know whether
Charles Wright's employment was verifiable.

Since the court was

uncertain about Mr. Wright's job status, it let stand the twelve
month jail term and conditioned his early release from jail upon
proof of employment.

(R 78-79).

Other probationary terms and

conditions allowed AP&P to monitor drug use or unlawful activity.
(R 78-79).
In short, there was nothing improper about the court's
sentence which ordered Mr. Wright to serve a (stayed) prison term, a
fine, a surcharge, and probation.

(R 77-79).

Indeed, immediately

following the court's July 11, 1994, sentencing order, Mr. Wright
began serving his probationary term in jail.

(R 79).

However, on August 29, 1994, a full fifty (50) days after
the July, 11, 1994, sentence, Mr. Wright was brought back before the
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court for resentencing despite the objections of defense counsel.
(R 83-84) .
According to the court, the July 11, 1994, sentence only
constituted "musings".

(R 91). While the court acknowledged the

July 11, 1994, proceeding, it attempted to justify another
sentencing proceeding on the grounds that:
When this matter was originally set for sentencing
[on July 11], there was not someone present from the
presentence arm of Adult Probation and Parole. . . .

As a consequence, I didn't realize that on some
prior occasion I had indicated I did need a
presentence report. There was no one here to be heard
from on the other side, and that's why I proceeded as
I did, because all I had in front of me was a
memorandum dated June 6, 1994, reciting only the
criminal history of the defendant.
When I was apprised that I did not have all the
information that I had originally sought, that was
when I made sure that I did not take the final step in
imposing a sentence, and that is, signing the
documents. That's when this matter was put back on
the schedule, and that's why we're here today.
(R 85-86) .
Contrary to its contentions, the court never conditioned
its sentence on the presence of AP&P.

In fact, the court

specifically allowed sentencing to proceed without the report.
Previously, on June 20, 1994, the court stated:
The court: All right. What I'll do is I'll set this
for the 11th of July, which is the first time she's
[original defense counsel] available to be back. But
in the meantime, I'm also going to order a presentence
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report. But that report will not be completed before
the 2nd of August.
If she [original defense counsel] can persuade me, we
can proceed on the 11th without the report being
completed, then I will do so. If not, then we711 keep
the next date that I give you.
So order a presentence report. I will set this for
July 11th at two p.m., and then we'll also set another
date, and that is August 1 at two p.m. for sentencing
in the event that we do in fact have the presentence
report.
(R 70) (June 20, 1994, proceeding) (emphasis added); accord (R 33).
On July 11, 1994, Mr. Wright and his original counsel
appeared before the court for sentencing.

While the presentence

report with a criminal history still was available, the report
ordered on June 20, 1994 was not ready.

(R 73-74) ("Apparently

somehow the referral never made it to [AP&P] or [AP&P] didn't get
down to interview Mr. Wright").
Nevertheless, the sentencing proceedings continued as
Mr. Wright's original counsel persuaded the court that even without
the ordered presentence report, cf. (R 70), Mr. Wright was entitled
to probation.

(R 75-76).

The State concurred in defense counsel's

recommendation of probation, (R 77), and Mr. Wright was allowed to
address the court before sentencing.

(R 77).

Accord Utah Code Ann.

§ 77-18-1(7) ("At the time of sentence, the court shall receive any
testimony, evidence, or information the defendant or the prosecuting
attorney desires to present concerning the appropriate sentence");
Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a).
The presentence report was not a prerequisite to
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sentencing, (R 70), nor is it required by statute.
Ann, § 77-18-1(5) (a).

See Utah Code

The court's claimed need for the report or

for someone from AP&P is unsupported by the record and by law.

Id.;

see also State v. Garfield, 552 P.2d 129 (Utah 1976) (contrary to
the court's belief that "the county attorney attending [the original
July 11, sentencing] . . . could not have been expected to know
. . . that we'd ordered a presentence report [,]" [R 85], "staff
lawyers in a prosecutor's office have the burden of 'letting the
left hand know what what the right hand is doing' or has done").
The court's attempt to use the written sentencing order of
August 29, 1994, to supersede the unwritten sentencing order of
July 11, 1994, was also erroneous.

The orally pronounced sentence

of July 11, 1994, should not have been altered.
The Tenth Circuit opinion of United States v. Villano, 816
F.2d 1448 (10th Cir. 1987), lends guidance.

The judge there orally

pronounced a sentence which amounted to eight years in prison.
However, the judgment and commitment order, signed the same day as
the sentencing proceeding, listed a prison term of ten years.

816

F.2d at 1450. Villano appealed his sentence and the circuit court
reversed.
"It is a firmly established and settled principle of
federal criminal law that an orally pronounced sentence controls
over a judgment and commitment order when the two conflict.

This

rule is recognized in virtually every circuit and has been the law
in this circuit since the 1930's." Villano, 816 F.2d at 1450-51

- 17 -

(footnotes omitted). 2

The Tenth Circuit court of appeals

acknowledged that a judgment must be signed, id. at 1451 n.4 (citing
Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(b)(1), but it still held that a signature was
not determinative of a sentence:
The sentence orally pronounced from the bench is
the sentence. One of the purposes of the written
judgment and commitment order is to provide evidence
of the sentence. The promulgation of Fed. R. Crim.
P. 32(b)(1) has not changed the rule that the judgment
in a criminal case is the sentence orally pronounced
from the bench. Although Rule 32(b) has "enhanced the

2. The Tenth Circuit cited widespread authority in support
of its holding "that the legally effective sentence is the oral
sentence and the judgment and commitment order is mere evidence of
the sentence." Villano, 816 F.2d at 1452. The cited authority is
reprinted verbatim:
United States v. Lewis, 626 F.2d 940, 953 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
("The oral sentence constitutes the judgment of the court
and is the authority for the execution of the court's
sentence. The written commitment is mere evidence of such
authority."); Borum v. United States, 409 F.2d 433, 440
(D.C. Cir. 1967, cert, denied, 395 U.S. 916, 89 S.Ct 1765,
23 L.Ed.2d 23 0 (1969) ("It was the pronouncement of sentence
. . . that constituted the judgment of the court."); Gilliam
v. United States, 269 F.2d 770, 772-73 (D.C. Cir. 1959)
("the order of judgment and commitment is merely evidence
of this sentence [the oral sentence]. . . . " ) ; Kennedy v.
Reid, 249 F.2d 492, 495 (D.C. Cir. 1957) ("The
pronouncement of sentence constitutes the judgment of the
court."); Rowley v. Welch, 114 F.2d 499, 501 (D.C. Cir.
1940); United States v. Marquez, 506 F.2d 620, 622 (2d Cir.
1974) ("the written judgment and commitment being nothing
more than mere evidence of the sentence imposed orally by
the judge."); Sasser v. United States, 352 F.2d 796, 797
(6th Cir. 1965), cert, denied, 385 U.S. 883, 87 S.Ct. 174,
17 L.Ed.2d 111 (1966) ("the pronouncement of sentence
represents the judgment of the court and that the order of
judgment is merely evidence of the sentence. . . . " ) ;
- [footnote continued on next page]-

- 18 -

prestige of the written judgment," it has not
abrogated the rule that the judgment in a federal
criminal case is the sentence pronounced from the
bench.
. . . Despite the existence of Rule 32(b), [which
became effective in 1946], the law continues to be
that the legally effective sentence is the oral
sentence and the judgment and commitment order is mere
evidence of the sentence. Altering the rule would
change the relative status of the oral sentence and
the judgment and commitment order by making the two
equal. As previously noted, however, the true
function of the written document is to help clarify an
ambiguous oral sentence by providing evidence of what
was stated. Because there is no ambiguity in this
case, the effect of the change would be to permit the
evidence of the sentence to replace the sentence when
there is a conflict. This is contrary to the purpose
of the judgment and commitment order and changes the
legal status of the oral sentence.
Changing the rule as suggested also would endanger
the right to be present at sentencing. . . .
A
defendant is present only when being sentenced from
the bench. Thus, a defendant is sentenced in absentia
when the judgment and commitment order is allowed to
control when there is a conflict.
Villano, 816 F.2d at 1451-52 (citations omitted).
Rule 32(b)(1) of the federal rules of criminal procedure
provides in pertinent part:

"A judgment of conviction shall set

2. -[footnote continued]Wilson v. Bell, 137 F.2d 716, 720 (6th Cir. 1943) ("the
judgment in a criminal case is the pronouncement by the
judge from the bench, not the entry of the judgment by the
clerk. The actual authority for execution of the judgment
is the sentence, and the commitment functions to make the
judgment of the court effective."); United States v. Weir,
724 F.2d 94, 95 (8th Cir. 1984) (per curiam) ("the oral
sentence and not the written order constitutes the actual
- [footnote continued on next page]-
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forth the plea, the verdict or findings, and the adjudication and
sentence. . . .

The judgment shall be signed by the judge and

entered by the clerk."

Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(b)(1).

Utah's

counterpart, Utah R. Crim. P. 22(c), -(d), completely omits a
signature requirement and suggests that the imposition of sentence
precedes the ministerial task of filling out the commitment form:

(c) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty . . . , the
court shall impose sentence and shall enter a judgment
of conviction which shall include the plea or the
verdict, if any, and the sentence. . . .
(d) When a jail or prison sentence is imposed, the
court shall issue its commitment setting forth the
sentence. The officer delivering the defendant to the
jail or prison shall deliver a true copy of the
commitment to the jail or prison and shall make his
return on the commitment and file it with the court.
Utah R. Crim. P. 22(c), - ( d ) .

2. - [footnote continued]judgment of the court.. . . . " ) ; Johnson v. Mabry, 602 F.2d
167, 170 (8th Cir. 1979) ("the oral sentence pronounced by
the sentencing judge constitutes the judgment, and anything
inconsistent with the judgment which is included in a
commitment order is a nullity."); Buie v. King, 137 F.2d
497, 499 (8th Cir. 1943); United States v. Munoz Dela Rosa,
495 F.2d 253, 256 (9th Cir. 1974) ("The only sentence that
is legally cognizable is the actual oral pronouncement in
the presence of the defendant."); Spriggs v. United States,
225 F.2d 865, 868 (9th Cir. 1955), cert, denied, 350 U.S.
954, 76 S.Ct. 342, 100 L.Ed. 830 (1956) ("The journal entry
or signed document is not the order of the court. The
order of the court is the pronouncement made by the judge
in open c o u r t . " ) ; Walden v. Hudspeth, 115 F.2d 558, 559
(10th Cir. 1940) (lf[t]he judgment is the pronouncement of
the court from the bench. The clerk's entry is not the
judgment by merely the formal evidence thereof.").
United States v. Villano, 816 F.2d 1448, 1452 n.5 (10th Cir. 1987).
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State v. Cousins, 302 N.W.2d 731 (Neb. 1981), offers
additional support in regards to the prevailing force of an oral
sentencing order.

There, the trial court inadvertently imposed

"concurrent" sentences when it had meant to say "consecutive"
sentences.

The appellate court, however, rejected the claim of

inadvertence:
to begin questioning whether a valid sentence has been
pronounced inadvertently would involve this court in a
morass. We would be called upon to read the mind of
the sentencing judge in any circumstance in which a
valid sentence had been pronounced and later amended
due to the judge's proclaimed inadvertence.
302 N.W.2d at 733; see also id. at 732 ("The rule is that a sentence
validly imposed takes effect from the time it is pronounced and that
a subsequent sentence fixing a different term is a nullity")
(citation omitted).

The Nebraska supreme court unanimously allowed

the orally pronounced "concurrent" sentence to remain in place even
though only six minutes had elapsed before the "consecutive"
sentence had been put in place.

Ld. at 732-33; cf:. State v. Penney,

776 P.2d 91, 93 (Utah App. 1989) ("An unambiguous order made in a
criminal proceeding cannot be varied by remarks made in a later
hearing to coincide with what the judge may have intended");
Villano, 816 P.2d at 1452 (since an oral sentence and a judgment and
commitment order are not equal, an unambiguous oral sentence cannot
be circumvented by such a writing).
As in Villano and Cousins, in Utah the written judgment and
commitment order is nothing more than clerical evidence of the
initially imposed oral sentence.

For example, in State v. Lorrah,
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761 P.2d 1388 (Utah 1988) (per curiam), the trial court, in
accordance with the statutory proscribed punishments for rape of a
child convictions, "orally pronounced sentence . . . that 'the
defendant be incarcerated . . . with the minimum recommendation of
ten years.'"

Id. at 1389. However, a later recorded "judgment,

sentence (commitment)" form mistakenly reflected a lesser sentence.
Defendant Lorrah attempted to use the recorded discrepancy in
support of his claim that the written sentencing form should control
over the oral sentence.

Id.

The appellate court disagreed.

Noting simply that the

"pronounced sentence . . . was improperly reduced to writing [,]" id.
at 1390, the opinion deferred to "the language and intent of the
court's pronouncement of oral sentence . . . "

^d. at 1389; see also

id. (on alternative grounds, although the oral sentence was proper,
the written sentence was illegal [it did not adhere to the necessary
statutory requirements] and thus could be corrected at any time).
One important fact further reflects why the court's oral
sentencing order exists in law and in application.

Immediately

following the July 11, 1994, sentencing proceeding, Charles David
Wright actually began serving his probationary term of twelve months
in jail.

(R 79).

Mr. Wright completed fifty days of his probation

before the court called him back for resentencing.

(R 79, 94).

A similar situation was held to be improper in Bullock v.
State, 705 S.W.2d 814 (Tex. App. 5 Dist. 1986).

In Bullock,

on April 2, 1985, the judge orally sentenced appellant
and ordered that his sentence run concurrently with
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any other sentences appellant was serving. However,
on April 16, 1985, after conducting a new sentencing
hearing and noting that he had orally entered into the
record that appellant's sentence should run
concurrently, the judge determined that it was his
intention that the sentence should run consecutively.
The judge then signed a judgment ordering that the
sentence run consecutively.
705 S.W.2d at 815.
On appeal, the court found the subsequent written order to
be null and void and of no legal effect.

"[I]n a criminal case, the

judgment cannot be modified to increase punishment, even during the
same term of the court, if the defendant has commenced service of
his imprisonment or paid his fine."

Id. at 815-16 (construing

United States v. Benz, 282 U.S. 304 (1931)); see Benz, 282 U.S. at
307 ("to increase the penalty is to subject the defendant to double
punishment for the same offense in violation of the Fifth
Amendment . . . " ) .
The Bullock opinion also rejected the notion that the
written judgment of April 16, 1985, constituted a nunc pro tunc
judgment which corrected the oral sentencing order of April 2,
1985.

Bullock, 705 S.W.2d at 816:
The purpose of a nunc pro tunc judgment is to
correct clerical errors and to make the record "speak
the truth." The correction can only be as to what was
actually done at the time and not what should have
been done. Here, the judge orally pronounced that the
sentence was to run concurrently. We hold that the
trial court cannot later change the judgment to
reflect what it "had intended to do," but did not do,
where the defendant has already commenced service
under the prior sentencing order.
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705 S.W.2d at 816 (emphasis added by the court and citations
omitted).
In Bullock, resentencing proceedings held fourteen days
after the original order were deemed unacceptable because the
defendant had begun his period of confinement.

Id. at 815-16.

In

the case at bar, Charles Wright had been confined for a full 50 days
of his initially imposed probationary sentence before he was brought
back before the court for resentencing.

(R 79, 94). Mr. Wright's

situation is equally unacceptable.
Under the lower court's claimed signature requirement, its
July 11, 1994, order did not constitute a "sentence", but it still
inexplicably carried enough force and effect to subject Mr. Wright
to a term of imprisonment.

(R 79, 86). Moreover, under the court's

flawed rationale, Mr. Wright fulfilled part of his probationary term
without a sentence even being in place.

(R 86, 94). Such reasoning

must fail.
The statutory and constitutional double jeopardy
protections aptly guard against such intolerable results.

See Utah

Code Ann. § 77-1-6 (2) (a); U.S. Const, amend. V; Utah Const, art. I
§ 12. The court's orally pronounced sentence, which included a
probationary term of twelve months in jail, may not be discounted as
a punishment if 50 days of that jail term were actually served.
Time in jail is a punishment, Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(2)(d), and a
subsequent written punishment cannot change that fact.

See Combs v.

Turner, 25 Utah 2d 397, 483 P.2d 437, 440 (1971) ("the great weight

- 24 -

of authority is to the effect that no change of sentence, even by
way of mitigation, is permissible after a prisoner has been
committed"); cf. Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a) (the 30 day limitation for
sentencing was clearly violated by the court's August 29, 1994,
sentence --an order which finally occurred ninety-eight [98] days
after Mr. Wright's plea had been entered).3
Because Mr. Wright actually served a period of
incarceration, the later addition of a signature to a typewritten
preprinted sentencing form truly becomes just a ministerial act for
purposes of sentencing.

Although a signed order is a final judgment

for purposes of appeal, see, e.g., Gallardo v. Bolinder, 800 P.2d
816, 817 (Utah 1990) (per curiam), appellate procedural filing
requirements do not nullify the validity of the initially imposed
oral sentence.

The Tenth Circuit in Villano was aware of, but

unpersuaded by, the signature requirement for judgments, see 816
F.2d at 1451 n.4 (citing Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(b) (1)), and courts in
general have not ignored the different stance afforded sentenced
persons who actually served part of their orally imposed sentence as
opposed to persons not yet affected.

See Combs v. Turner, 25 Utah

3. When the court finally signed its August 29, 1994,
sentencing order, Mr. Wright had been incarcerated for 163 days.
(R 38, 94-95). His plea was entered on May 23, 1994 and 98 days had
passed before the court signed its August 29, 1994, sentencing
order. (R 38, 63, 94). Although a June 20, 1994 sentencing date
was rescheduled, (R 70), the 30 day limitation for sentencing still
was violated due to the 49 day expiration of time between July 11,
1994, and August 29, 1994. Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a). Mr. Wright only
agreed to continue sentencing until July 11, 1994.

- 25 -

2d 397, 483 P.2d 437, 440 (1971) (since "the original sentences had
gone into effect, and that one day of imprisonment . . . under the
sentences had passed at the time the order was made vacating them[,]
[t]he circuit judge had no power at that time to vacate the
sentences because the authority over "the prisoners had passed out of
his hands by his own order") (citation omitted); Bullock v. State,
705 S.W.2d 814 (Tex. App. 5 Dist. 1986).
Parry v. State, 837 P.2d 998 (Utah App. 1992), is not
inconsistent with the case at bar.

In Parry, "the trial court

apparently [orally] described the aggravated burglary [conviction]
as 'aggravated burglary, a third degree felony.7"
(emphasis added by the court).

Id. at 998

The subsequent written judgment and

sentence form, however, read, "Aggravated Burglary, a First Degree
Felony."

I_d. (emphasis added by the court).
Explaining that the initial oral sentence "created an

illegal or impossible conviction," the Parry opinion held that the
subsequent written judgment appropriately corrected the initial
defective sentence.

See id. at 999 ("The trial court's oral

judgment of 'aggravated burglary, a third degree felony,' created an
illegal or impossible conviction, because under Utah's statutory
definition of aggravated burglary, it is a first degree felony").
The trial court's denial of defendant Parry's petition for writ of
habeas corpus was affirmed.

Id.

By comparison, the court's July 11, 1994, sentencing order
was not illegal.

(R 77-79).

It lawfully set forth the appropriate

prison term, a fine, a surcharge, and a period of probation.
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(R 78-79) . See Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-63a-l(b) (i) (A) ; 76-3-201 (2) (c);
76-3-203(3); 76-3-301 (1) (b); and 77-18-1 (2) (a) .
Viewed differently, the trial court in Parry retained
jurisdiction to correct its initial unlawful oral sentence and it
did so through its written judgment.

Parry, 837 P.2d at 999. Oral

or written means may have both been used to fix the initial
illegality.

See Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e) ("The court may correct an

illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in an illegal manner, at any
time") .
In Mr. Wright's case, however, since the court's initial
sentence was lawful, the court was powerless to change an order
which did not require correction.

See State v. Montoya, 825 P.2d

676, 679 (Utah 1991) ("Once a court imposes a valid sentence, it
loses subject matter jurisdiction over the case"); People v. Day,
339 N.W.2d 204 (Mich. App. 1983) (original oral orders were valid
final sentences which left the court "without jurisdiction to vacate
or amend those sentences" even though the second sentencing
proceedings resulted from the defendant's verbal outbursts and his
exposing of himself); Richards v. Siddoway, 24 Utah 2d 314, 471 P.2d
143, 146 (1970) ("The law does not permit any judicial tribunal to
exercise any revisory power over its own adjudications after they
have, in contemplation of the law, passed out of the breast of the
judge"); 471 P.2d at 145 ("Judicial errors in judgments are to be
corrected by appeal"); cf_. Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b) (trial courts may
only correct "clerical" errors).

Hence, the court's resentencing of
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Mr. Wright also was an improper and jurisdictionally4 invalid
attempt to correct its own prior ruling.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Wright respectfully requests this Court to vacate the
lower court's second sentencing order of August 29, 1994, and to
reinstate in its place the originally valid July 11, 1994, oral
sentence.
SUBMITTED this

day of February, 1995.

RONALD S. FUJINO
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

VERNICE AH CHING
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

4. Inherent in the arguments below were those involving
jurisdiction. See (R 83-84) (counsel informed the court that it
"cannot change a sentence unless it is an illegally imposed
sentence"). In any event, "a court's jurisdiction may be challenged
at any time, even on appeal [.]" State v. Schlosser, 774 P.2d 1132,
1139 (Utah 1989).
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ADDENDUM A

63-63a-L Surcharge — Application and exemptions,
II) (a) A surcharge shall be paid on all criminal fines, penalties, and forfeitures imposed by the courts,
(b) The surcharge shall be:
(i) 85% upon conviction of a:
(A) felony;
(B) class A misdemeanor,
(C) violation of Title 41, Chapter 6, Article 5, Driving While
Intoxicated and Reckless Driving; or
(D) class B misdemeanor not classified within Title 41, Motor
Vehicles, including violation of comparable county or municipal
ordinances; or

76-3-201

CRIMINAL CODE

(2) Within the limits prescribed by this chapter, a court may sentence a
person adjudged guilty of an offense to any one of the following sentences or
combination of them:
(a) to pay a fine;
(b) to removal from or disqualification of public or private office;
(c) to probation unless otherwise specifically provided by law;
(d) to imprisonment;
(e) to life imprisonment;
(f) on or after April 27, 1992, to life in prison without parole, or
(g) to death.

76-3-20?)

Felony conviction — Indeterminate term of imprisonment — Increase of sentence if firearm
used.

A person who has been convicted of a felony i i be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term as follows:
(1) In the case of a felony of the first degree, for a term at not less than
five years, unless otherwise specifically provided by law, and which may
be for life but if the trier of fact finds a firearm or a facsimile or the
representation of a firearm was used in the commission or furtherance of
the felony, the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted for a
term of one year to run consecutively and not concurrently; and the court
may additionally sentence the person convicted for an indeterminate
term not to exceed five years to run consecutively and not concurrently;
(2) In the case of a felony of the second degree, for a term at not less
than one year nor more than 15 years but if the trier of fact finds a
firearm or a facsimile or the representation of a firearm was used in the
commission or furtherance of the felony, the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted for a term of one year to run consecutively and
not concurrently; and the court may additionally sentence the person
convicted for an indeterminate term not to exceed five years to run consecutively and not concurrently;
(3) In the case of a felony of the third degree, for a term not to exceed
five years but if the trier of fact finds a firearm or a facsimile or the
representation of a firearm was used in the commission or furtherance of
the felony, the court may additionally sentence the person convicted for
an indeterminate term not to exceed five years to run consecutively and
not concurrently

76-4-102. Attempt — Classification of offenses.
Criminal attempt to commit:
(1) A capital felony is a felony of the first degree;
(2) A felony of the first degree is a felony of the second degree; except
that an attempt to commit child kidnaping, or to commit a violation of
Section 76-5-301.1 or to commit any of those felonies described in Part 4
of Chapter 5 of this title which are felonies of the first degree, is a felony
of the first degree;
(3) A felony of the second degree is a felony of the third degree;
(4) A felony of the third degree is a class A misdemeanor;
(5) A class A misdemeanor is a class B misdemeanor;
(6) A class B misdemeanor is a class C misdemeanor,
(7) A class C misdemeanor is punishable by a penalty not exceeding
one half the penalty for a class C misdemeanor.

76-10-306. Definitions — Persons exempted — Penalties
for possession, use, or removal of explosives,
chemical, or incendiary devices and possession
of components.
(3) Any person who knowingly, intentionally, or recklessly possesses or
controls an explosive, chemical, or incendiary device is guilty of a felony of the
second degree.

77-1-6. Rights of defendant
(1) In criminal prosecutions the defendant is entitled:
(a) To appear in person and defend in person or by counsel;
(b) To receive a copy of the accusation filed against him;
(c) To testify in his own behalf;
(d) To be confronted by the witnesses against him;
(e) To have compulsory process to insure the attendance of witnesses in
his behalf;
(f) To a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district
where the offense is alleged to have been committed;
(g) To the right of appeal in all cases; and
(h) To be admitted to-bail in accordance with provisions of law, or be
entitled to a trial within 30 days after arraignment if unable to post bail
and if the business of the court permits.
(2) In addition:
(a) No person shall be put twice in jeopardy for the same offense;
(b) No accused person shall, before final judgment, be compelled to
advance money or fees to secure rights guaranteed by the Constitution or
the laws of Utah, or to pay the costs of those rights when received;
(c) No person shall be compelled to give evidence against himself;
(d) A wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband nor a
husband against his wife; and
(e) No person shall be convicted unless by verdict of a jury, or upon a
plea of guilty or no contest, or upon a judgment of a court when trial by
jury has been waived or, in case of an infraction, upon a judgment by a

# f -JLO-jLm uuspciuAuu ui BCUI«IICV — x~ieas neiu in aoeyance
— Probation — Supervision — Presentence investigation — Standards — Confidentiality —
Terms and conditions — Restitution — Termination, revocation, modification! or extension —Hearings.
(1) On a plea of guilty or no contest entered bjr& defendant in conjunction
with a plea in abeyance agreement, the court may hold the plea in abeyance as
provided in Title 77, Chapter 2a, Pleas in Abeyance, and under the terms of the
plea in abeyance agreement.
(2) (a) On a plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, no contest, or conviction
of any crime or offense, the court may suspend the imposition or execution
of sentence and place the defendant on probation. The court may place the
defendant:
(i) on probation under the supervision of the Department of Corrections except in cases of class C misdemeanors or infractions;
(ii) on probation with an agency of local government or with a
private organization; or
(iii) on bench probation under the jurisdiction of the sentencing
court.
(b) (i) The legal custody of all probationers under the supervision of the
department is with the Department of Corrections.
(ii) The legal custody of all probationers under the jurisdiction ot
the sentencing court is vested as ordered by the court. The court has
continuing jurisdiction over all probationers.
(5) (a) Prior to the imposition of any sentence, the court may, with the
concurrence of the defendant, continue the date for the imposition of
sentence for a reasonable period of time for the purpose of obtaining a
presentence investigation report from the Department of Corrections or
information from other sources about the defendant.
(7) At the time of sentence, the court shall receive any testimony, evidence,
or information the defendant or the prosecuting attorney desires to present
concerning the appropriate sentence. This testimony, evidence, or information
shall be presented in open court on record and in the presence of the defendant

Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order.
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other
parts of the record and errors therein arisingfromoversight or omission may
be corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of
any party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the pendency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the appeal is
docketed m the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is nendin*
may be so corrected with leave of the appellate court

Rule 22. Sentence, judgment and commitment.
(a) Upon the entry of a plea or verdict of guilty or plea of no contest, the
court shall set a time for imposing sentence which shall be not less than two
nor more than 30 days after the verdict or plea, unless the court, with the
concurrence of the defendant, otherwise orders. Pending sentence, the court
may commit the defendant or may continue or alter bail or recognizance.
Before imposing sentence the court shall afford the defendant an opportunity to make a statement in his own behalf and to present any information in
mitigation of punishment, or to show any legal cause why sentence should not
be imposed. The prosecuting attorney shall also be given an opportunity to
present any information material to the imposition of sentence.
(b) On the same grounds that a defendant may be tried in his absence, he
may likewise be sentenced in his absence. If a defendant fails to appear for
sentence, a warrant for his arrest may be issued by the court.
(c) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty or plea of no contest, the court shall
impose sentence and shall enter a judgment of conviction which shall include
the plea or the verdict, if any, and the sentence. Following imposition of
sentence, the court shall advise the defendant of his right to appeal and the
time within which any appeal shall be filed.
(d) When a jail or prison sentence is imposed, the court shall issue its
commitment setting forth the sentence. The officer delivering the defendant to
the jail or prison shall deliver a true copy of the commitment to the jail or
prison and shall make his return on the commitment and file it with the court.
(e) The court may correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in an
illegal manner, at any time.

Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.]
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and
defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to
be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is
alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to
advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused
shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be
compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor
shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.

Amend. V

CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

AMENDMENT V
[Criminal actions — Provisions concerning — Due process
of law and just compensation clauses.]
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases
arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in
time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation.
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THE COURT:

7

STATE OF UTAH VS. CHARLES

DAVID WRIGHT CR 94-519.

6

MR. WRIGHT IS NOW PRESENT.

MR. PARKER HERE FOR THE STATE.

MR. MAURO

HERE FOR THE DEFENDANT.

81
9

1994

MR. MAURO:

YOUR HONOR, I GUESS THIS IS A

CASE —

FIRST OF ALL, RICH MAURO ON BEHALF OF MR.

10

WRIGHT.

I AM COVERING THIS MATTER FOR VERNIECE

11

AU CHING.

12

I TOO HAVE RECEIVED THIS FILE TODAY.

AND I

13

GUESS I'M GOING TO ASSERT THE KAREN STAM RULE AND

14

SEE IF WE COULD PROCEED TODAY, WITH SOME

15

RECOMMENDATIONS.

16

THE COURT:

UNLESS IT'S BAD NEWS.

17

MR. MAURO:

THAT WILL —

WE WOULD PROPOSE

18

TO THE COURT —

19

COURT CONSIDER HAVING MS. AU CHING, WHO KNOWS A

20

LITTLE MORE ABOUT THINGS AND CAN ADDRESS THE COURT.

21
22
23

OTHERWISE, WE MAY WANT TO HAVE THE

THE COURT:

I THINK YOU BETTER HAVE

MS. AU CHING COME BACK ON THIS.
MR. MAURO:

BECAUSE I TALKED TO MR. WRIGHT

24

AND INDICATED TO HIM I FELT MORE COMFORTABLE, AT

25

LEAST IN LIGHT OF MY LOOKING AT THE PRESENTENCE

b«067

REPORT, TO HAVE MS. AU CHING ADDRESS

COURT.

INDICATED THAT HE WANTEP

OVER

THINK IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT
THE COURT:
1

THOUGH,

~

THE ONLY PRESENTENCE REPORT,

:RIMIN*

BE BE'

HE

WOULD

ERVED TO WAIT UNTIL MS. AU CHING GETS

HERE.
|

THE DEFEND»
THE COURT:

BECAUSE SHE KNOWS MORE ABOUT

10

THE CASE, AND IT WOULD PROBABLY BE

11 J

TODAY

12 1

HA

13

ABLE TO ADDRESS IT BASED ON THE BACKGROUND.

14
15

18j

I'M', HER:

DO WE KNOW WHY THE ONLY THING

WE HAVE IS THAT CRIMINAL HISTORY?
THE COURT:

BECAUS

uREADY IN

MR. MAURO'

NO, HE WAS IN PRISON BEFORE.

i

19

I BELIEVE THAT HAS BEEN TERM

20 I

CO-DEFENDANT WAS IN PRISON

21j

CO-DEFENDANT WAS ALSO

22

BUT AT LEAST YOU

BETTER SHOT IF MS. AU CHING WAS HERE AND IS

III

16

17 I

IT MAY MTII.I, HI', HAD NKW:;

THE COURT:

THINK THE
COURT.
".nnr

™

: l\l', II' WK IIAVI', AN •••LP PRESENTENCE REPORT PREPARED IN
*:«
25 1

ANOTHER COURT?
I MEAN,

REASON, WE NEED

1

MS. AU CHING TO REFRESH OUR RECOLLECTION ON THIS.

21
3

MR. PARKER:

I

ASSUMED THERE WAS A

PRESENTENCE REPORT, BUT I DON'T SEE IT.

4

MR. MAURO:

LET ME TELL YOU WHY THERE IS

5

NO PRESENTENCE.

6

OF IOWA —

7

AGREEMENT IN THIS CASE WAS THAT IF MR. WRIGHT AGREED

8

TO RETURN TO THE STATE OF IOWA, THAT THE

9

RECOMMENDATION WOULD BE PROBATION.

10

THERE WAS A OLD —

EXTRADITION HOLD.

OUT OF THE STATE

AND PART OF THE PLEA

WHAT SHE DOES IS CONTACT THE MR. KADELL,

11

WHO IS THE HEAD OF THE WARRANTS DIVISION AT THE

12 1

SHERIFFS OFFICE, AND SHE DISCOVERED THAT IOWA

13

DOESN'T HAVE AN NCIC WARRANT, ONLY A LEGAL WARRANT

14

IN IOWA.

15

SO THAT'S WHERE WE ARE AT, I THINK.

16
17

SO THEY ARE NOT GOING TO EXTRADITE HIM.

THE COURT:

I WONDER IF WE OUGHT TO HAVE A

PRESENTENCE REPORT DONE AT THIS TIME, THEN.

18

MR. MAURO:

THAT MAY BE APPROPRIATE.

19

THE COURT:

ALL RIGHT.

20

DO IS THIS.

21

REPORT.

22 I

BACK NEXT WEEK?

23

WHAT I'M GOING TO

I'M GOING TO ORDER A PRESENTENCE

I'M GOING TO -- IS MS. AU CHING GOING TO BE

MR. MAURO:

24

5TH, IS MY NOTE.

25

HAWAII.

SHE'S GOING TO BE BACK ON JULY

SHE'S VISITING SOME FAMILY IN

16
THE COURT:

DON'T FOLKS KNOW THAT WHEN

WHEN WE SET SENTEM"
TIII'IV ARE GlUNG TO DF"
MR. MAURO:

DON'T THINK —

JUDGE

THINK ""'*"";: SHERE

THE COURT:

RIGHT.

FIRST TIME SHE'S AVAILABLE
MEANTIME,

! ALSO GOING

WHAT

' „

BE BACK.

IN THE

ORDER A PRESENTENCE
OMPLETED

BEFORE THE 2ND

AUGUST.

IF SHE CAN PERSUADE ME, WE CAN PROCEED ON
REPORT BEING COMPLETED, THEN I
THEN WE'LL KEEP THE NEXT DATE
x h A i - -L u i

SO ORDER A PRESENTENCE REPORT.
THIS FOR JULY 11TH AT TWO P. M.,

I WILL SET

AND THEN WE'LL

1ET ANOTHER DATE, AND '
SENTENCING IN THE EVENT THAT WE DO
."HE PRESENTENCE REPORT.
22j
1
24

MR. MAURO:

THAN*

, THAT I HAVE.
THE COURT:

SO YOU CAN TELL THEM THAT THEY

